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ABSTRACT. Mohrhoff proposes using the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz
(ABL) rule for time-symmetric “objective” (meaning non-epistemic)
probabilities corresponding to the possible outcomes of
not-actually-performed measurements between specified pre- and
post-selection measurement outcomes. It is emphasized that the ABL rule
was formulated on the assumption that such intervening measurements are
actually made and that it does not necessarily apply to counterfactual
situations. The exact nature of the application of the ABL rule considered by
Mohrhoff is made explicit and is shown to fall short of his stated
counterfactual claim.
Ulrich Mohrhoff1 distinguishes between “subjective” and “objective”
probabilities in quantum mechanics. This type of distinction has been made
by others2; Mohrhoff proposes to modify it by adding a time-symmetric
aspect in which the relevant “facts”3 describing a quantum system include
not just the pre-selection outcome but also the post-selection outcome.
However, his discussion of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (“ABL”) rule4
as related to counterfactual statements about possible intervening
measurements between pre- and post-selection does not address the
numerous objections in the literature to the counterfactual usage of ABL
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probabilities.5 6 Moreover, his usage of the ABL rule implicitly assumes
special conditions. When these special conditions are made explicit, it
appears that the actual claim being made is distinct from, and arguably
weaker than, the claim as stated in [1].
The ABL rule was formulated on the assumption that intervening
measurements at a time t, ta < t < tb, are actually made, and would therefore
appear to correspond to what Mohrhoff is calling “subjective” probabilities.
However, he wishes to consider time-symmetric objective probabilities in
which a possible intervening measurement of some observable Q is not
actually performed. Various proofs have been given of the inapplicability of
the ABL rule to this kind of situation. Those proofs demonstrated that the
counterfactual usage of the ABL rule yields consequences that are
inconsistent with quantum theory (see footnote [5], esp. Sharp & Shanks
1993, Cohen 1995, Miller 1996). Vaidman has questioned the validity of such
proofs7 and they have been defended in Cohen [5, 1998] and Kastner [5]8.
Thus there is still an active controversy on this point which Mohrhoff does
not address in [1].9
Mohrhoff claims that the ABL rule can be applied to statements such as:
Statement 1: “If a measurement of observable Q were performed on
system S between the (actual) preparation of the probability measure |a〉〈a|
at time ta and the (actual) observation of the property |b〉〈b| at time tb, but
no measurement is actually performed between ta and tb, then the
measurement of Q would yield qi with probability p (qi|a, b).”
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Now, if we look at Mohrhoff’s application of the ABL rule, what is
actually being done is the following. A possible world j is found in which
system S happens to have the same pre- and post-selection outcomes as it did
in the actual world (i). The ABL rule is then applied, not to the actual world,
but to this possible world j.11 Thus Mohrhoff’s application actually supports
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the following statement, which differs significantly from Statement (1):
Statement 2: “In the possible world j in which observable Q is measured
and system S yields outcomes a and b at times ta and tb respectively, the
probability of obtaining result qk at time t is given by PABL(qk|a, b).”
It should be noted that the possible world j referred to in Statement
2—the one in which system S happens to end up with the same pre- and
post-selection results as in the actual world— is only one member of a set W
of worlds which differ from the actual world in that observable Q is
measured. The other worlds in this set are worlds in which observable Q is
measured at time t and the pre- and/or post-selection outcomes are not the
same as in the actual world.
To sum up the situation so far: In Mohrhoff’s counterfactual claim, the
ABL rule is applied not to the actual world (in which no measurement was
performed at time t), but rather to a possible world in which the
measurement at time t is performed and the quantum system has the same
pre- and post-selection outcomes as in the actual world. The result thus
obtained is claimed to apply to the actual world inasmuch as it is claimed to
give an answer to a question about how our world might have been different
between the times ta and tb (with their associated outcomes), were a certain
measurement made (i.e., it is claimed to provide a basis for the truth of
Statement 1). Let us call this kind of claim a “counterfactual†,” where the
“†” signifies that it is a new type of counterfactual claim which may or may
not be immune to the type of objections previously raised in the literature.
Our task, then, is to analyse this counterfactual† and determine whether it
avoids the conclusion of proofs such as that of Sharp & Shanks [5].12
Let us first clarify what is involved in considering hypothetical situations
involving measurements that were not actually made. Consider the following
question from the viewpoint of an experimenter— a physicist to whom we
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will henceforth refer as “Dr. X”— who preselects particles in state |a〉 at ta
and post-selects particles in state |b〉 at tb.
Dr. X asks himself: “In general, what would have happened if I had made
a measurement at time t that I did not, in fact make? How might the data of
my experiment change?”
One part of the answer to this question is that particles that were found
to be in state |b〉 at tb might not have ended up in the same state.
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Therefore, from Dr. X’s point of view, the appropriate and correct
counterfactual statement of the ABL rule would be worded as follows:
Statement 1′: “Consider system S having pre- and post-selection results a
and b at times ta and tb when a measurement of observable Q was not
performed. If a measurement of observable Q had been performed at time
t, ta < t < tb on S, and if S had the same pre- and post-selection outcomes as
above, outcome qk would have resulted with probability PABL(qk|a, b),”
Now, for Dr. X the second, italicized “if” clause is a big “if,” in view of
his question and answer above. Acknowledging this second “if” takes into
account that the background conditions that must hold in order to apply the
ABL rule counterfactually to system S—namely, that it must have the same
pre- and post-selection results as in the actual world—are not guaranteed to
hold if the measurement is actually performed. (See footnote [13].)
In the absence of the caveat of the second “if,” which considerably
weakens the counterfactual claim, such background conditions have to satisfy
the following requirement, which is itself a counterfactual statement:
Requirement C: If a measurement of observable Q had been performed,
system S would (with certainty) have been pre- and post-selected with
outcomes a and b as in the actual world.
This requirement is often referred to as “cotenability”: if the necessary
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background conditions are not cotenable with the antecedent (i.e., the
measurement of Q), then a counterfactual statement such as Statement 1,
which crucially depends on the stability of those background conditions, fails.
Now, it is obvious that in the pre- and post-selection situation considered
by Mohrhoff, Requirement C is not satisfied. As Dr. X observes above, if he
had in fact measured Q, then system S might not have been post-selected.
However, Mohrhoff argues that cotenability is not an issue for his new
counterfactual† ; all he requires is that a possible world j exists in which he
can apply the ABL rule, with pre- and post-selection results a and b, to
system S. Therefore his argument is essentially the following: to make a
counterfactual claim like that of Statement (1), all one need do is to find a
possible world in which required background conditions happen to hold,
apply the ABL rule to the counterpart of system S in that possible world,
and then claim that the result applies to the actual system S.
A diagram may help to make clear the exact nature of Mohrhoff’s
counterfactual† claim.14 It is argued that one should take into account that
the outcome of the final measurement was the value b. This outcome should
be viewed as “fixed,” the idea being that the final conditions should have the
same status as the initial conditions; in other words, one assumes a
two-valued temporal boundary condition. This is equivalent to assuming that
the appropriate probability to be assigned to the event b at t2 is unity, the
posterior probability of outcome b (since it actually happened). That is,
questions about what might have happened other than outcome b, are now
viewed as irrelevant, since the applicable probabilities for such questions are
prior probabilities and as such do not take into account all relevant facts.
Now, one considers a system of possible worlds with the following
characteristics (refer to Figure 1):
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{Q1}
{Q2}
{Q3}
{Q4}
{Q5}
t1 t2
a
Figure 1. The system of possible worlds assumed in Mohrhoff’s ABL counterfactual†.
b
Each of the curved lines represents a set of possible worlds {Qj} in which
a measurement of the observable Qj is performed at time t. The individual
member worlds of each set {Qj} are identified with the possible outcomes of
measurements of Qj. (Thus a particular set of worlds {Qj} here corresponds
to the possible world j referred to above, with additional structure.) Within
this proposed construct, the ABL probability is assumed to give the
subjective probability applying to an observer Dr. X† associated with the set
of worlds {Qj} in which the measurement of Qj is performed.
15 In
Mohrhoff’s counterfactual† , this probability is then held to apply
(objectively) to a different world—the world of Dr. X—in that it is claimed
to give an answer to the question corresponding to Statement (1), i.e.: “If
(contrary to fact) a measurement of Qj had been performed between the
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actual outcomes at ta and tb, what would be the probability that Dr. X
would find outcome qjk (one of the eigenvalues of Qj)?”
However, such a claim would seem to conflate two distinctly different
perspectives or frames of reference. In being invoked in Statement (1), the
ABL rule is being applied counterfactually to Dr. X’s world, since it is from
that frame of reference that the claim is being made. Yet when called upon
to justify his counterfactual† , Mohrhoff argues from the non-counterfactual
perspective of Dr. X† .
For example, Mohrhoff’s objection to the Sharp & Shanks proof, like
Vaidman’s, consists in demanding that the “counterfactual” measurement be
considered as performed, in contrast to the proof which assumes that, in
accordance with Dr. X’s perspective, the measurement is not performed.
Thus, according to Mohrhoff, the calculation should be considered as
applying to the world(s) of Dr. X† rather than to the world of Dr. X. But
Dr. X† ’s perspective is markedly different from that of Dr. X, and it is Dr.
X who is making the counterfactual claim (Statement 1). The proof applies
to Dr. X and his claim, not to someone who has actually performed the
measurement. One does not refute a proof by arguing that it does not apply
to a frame of reference for which it was not intended. Thus Mohrhoff’s
counterfactual† formulation, which postulates a hypothetical system of
worlds in which non-counterfactual applications of the ABL rule are held to
apply to those possible worlds, fails to evade the conclusion of the proofs
which address the actual world in which no such measurement is performed.
To conclude, it has been argued that Mohrhoff’s application of the ABL
rule, which depends on a specially chosen system of possible worlds, fails to
support his stated counterfactual claim based on that rule. Moreover, his
objection to the proofs demonstrating the nonvalidity of the counterfactual
usage of the ABL rule fails to refute those proofs, because it does not apply
to the actual world addressed by the proofs.
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Finally, it should be noted that none of the arguments in this Comment
presuppose any time-asymmetry assumptions. Nor are any underlying
metaphysical assumptions about time “flow” or subjective, “classical”
experience invoked or required. The present author fully agrees with the
basic result (relevant to this discussion) originally obtained by ABL, which
was the following: “...during the time interval between two noncommuting
observations, we may assign to a system the quantum state corresponding to
the observation that follows with as much justification as we assign,
ordinarily, the state corresponding to the preceding measurement.”16
The above quoted statement considers either temporal direction as being
equally valid as far as quantum theory is concerned (where here, “temporal
direction” simply means whether one regards the parameter t as increasing or
decreasing in the applicable laws). However, it does not consider combining
both temporal directions as is implied in a counterfactual usage of the ABL
rule. I.e., nothing in the ABL paper suggests holding fixed both pre- and
post-selection states while considering not-actually -performed measurements
during that time interval.17
Acknowledgements.
I would like to thank Ulrich Mohrhoff for an interesting exchange of views.
8
1U. Mohrhoff. ‘What Quantum Mechanics is Trying to Tell Us,’ American Journal of
Physics 68, 728-745 (2000).
2See, for example, R.I.G. Hughes. The Structure and Interpretation of Quantum Mechan-
ics (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989, p. 218.; A. Shimony. “Search for
a worldview which can accomodate our knowledge of microphysics,” in J. Cushing and E.
McMullin, eds., Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory (University of Notre Dame
Press, Notre Dame, 1989), p. 27; A. Shimony, Search for a Naturatistic World View, Vol.
II (Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 1993), pp. 141-2. Mohrhoff defines subjec-
tive probabilities as applying only in cases in which measurements have been made and an
observer is ignorant of the result of the measurement, which differs slightly from Hughes’
use of the term (see note [3]).
3Mohrhoff applies the term “fact” to measurement outcomes only (whether known or un-
known), as opposed to possessed properties independent of measurement (which he denies).
4Y. Aharonov, P. G. Bergmann, and J. L. Lebowitz. ‘Time Symmetry in the Quantum
Process of Measurement,’ Physical Review B 134, 1410-16 (1964).
5See, for instance, J. Bub and H. Brown. ‘Curious Properties of Quantum Ensembles
Which Have Been Both Preselected and Post-Selected,’ Physical Review Letters 56, 2337-
2340 (1986); W. Sharp and N. Shanks. ‘The Rise and Fall of Time-Symmetrized Quan-
tum Mechanics,’ Philosophy of Science 60, 488-499 (1993); O. Cohen. ‘Pre- and postse-
lected quantum systems, counterfactual measurements, and consistent histories, ’ Physical
Review A 51, 4373-4380 (1995); ‘Reply to “Validity of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz
Rule”, ’ Physical Review A 57, 2254-2255 (1998); D. J. Miller. ‘Realism and Time Symme-
try in Quantum Mechanics,’ Physics Letters A 222, 31-36 (1996); R. E. Kastner. ‘Time-
Symmetrised Quantum Theory, Counterfactuals, and “Advanced Action,”’ Studies in His-
tory and Philosophy of Modern Physics 30, 237-259 (1999); ‘The Three-Box Paradox and
Other Reasons to Reject the Counterfactual Usage of the ABL Rule,’ Foundations of Physics
29, 851-863 (1999); ‘TSQT “Elements of Possibility”?,’ Studies in History and Philosophy
of Modern Physics 30, 399-402 (1999).
6As it happens, Mohrhoff’s specific example of a counterfactual use of the ABL rule
corresponds to a special case in which that use is valid (in the strong sense of Statement
1). This is an example in which a particle is pre- and post-selected with outcomes a and
b corresponding to noncommuting observables A and B, and counterfactual measurements
of either A or B are considered at time t. (The validity of a counterfactual usage of the
ABL rule in cases like this has been shown in detail in Kastner [5] and in Cohen [5].) But
this is a special case and, as has been discussed at length in the literature, “would”-type
counterfactual uses of the ABL rule are generally invalid.
7L. Vaidman. ‘Validity of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz Rule,’ Physical Review A
57, 2251-2253 (1998).
8In his reply to this Comment, Mohrhoff rejects my defense of the Sharp and Shanks
proof on the basis that I allegedly assume the reality of ensembles in situations concerning
only one particle. This remark misunderstands my use of ensembles. The term “ensemble”
as I am using it denotes not a real collection of particles, but rather a conceptual ensemble
in the sense of statistical mechanics (cf. R. K. Pathria. Statistical Mechanics (Pergamon
Press, Oxford, 1972), p. 4).
9In his reply to this Comment, Mohrhoff essentially repeats the objection to the Sharp
and Shanks proof previously given by Vaidman[7]. In this attempt to refute the proofs
of Sharp and Shanks and others (which all have essentially the same structure), Vaidman
and Mohrhoff simply assume that the “counterfactual” measurement is performed in all
expressions employed in the proof. Then, of course, there can be no inconsistency with the
9
predictions of quantum mechanics. But this is no refutation, for it explicitly assumes as true
that which is manifestly false: namely, that the “counterfactual” measurement is actually
made. This procedure is then justified by claiming that the computation applies not to the
actual world but to a specially chosen possible world. If such a procedure were to be allowed,
then one could argue for something manifestly false in the actual world merely by finding a
specially chosen possible world in which it is true.
10‘Objective probabilities, quantum counterfactuals, and the ABL rule: Apropos of Kast-
ner’s comment,’ quant-ph/0006116 (2000) (a preprint version of Mohrhoff’s reply to the
present Comment).
11U. Mohrhoff, quant-ph/0006116, p. 4: “If we think of the measurement of Q as taking
place in a possible world, we consider a world in which all the relevant facts are exactly
as they are in the actual world, except that in this possible world there is one additional
relevant fact indicating the value possessed by Q at a time between ta and tb.”
12Sharp and Shanks (1993) consider an ensemble of spin- 1
2
particles prepared at time
t1 in the state |a1〉 (read as ‘spin up along direction a’). They then assume that this
ensemble is subjected to a final post- selection spin measurement at time t2 along direction
b (i.e., the observable σb is measured). This measurement yields two subensembles Ei, i =
1, 2 corresponding to results spin up or spin down along direction b. The weight of each
subensemble Ei is given by |〈bi|a1〉|
2.
Now they consider each subensemble individually, asking the counterfactual question: If
we had measured the spin of these particles along direction c (i.e., observable σc) at a time
t between t1 and t2, what would have been the probability for outcome c1? They use
the ABL rule to calculate the probability of outcome c1 for each subensemble Ei for such
a counterfactual measurement. They then show that the total probability of outcome c1
derived from the above calculation, taking into account the weights of the two subensembles
Ei, in general disagrees with the quantum mechanical probability, which is given simply by
|〈ci|a1〉|
2.
13One can, of course, deny this statement if one assumes fatalism (i.e., everything that
happens must happen). But then it must also be assumed that there is no possibility
of a “counterfactual” measurement at time t, since it is a recordable matter of fact that
no such measurement occurred, and according to fatalism, that documented absence of a
measurement is also a fact that must happen.
14Mohrhoff has confirmed in a private correspondence that the diagram discussed herein
correctly illustrates his proposed possible world structure.
15However, this assumption can be disputed, since under the given construct (which as-
sumes that outcome b definitely occurs at t2), the conditional probabilities P (b|qjk) (where
qjk is an eigenvalue of the associated observable Qj) are unity, rather than the standard
quantum mechanical conditional probabilities as assumed in the ABL rule.
16ABL (1964), abstract.
17ABL (1964) do say “We shall now consider an ensemble of systems whose initial and final
states are fixed to correspond to the particular eigenvalues a and b, respectively; we ask for
the probability that the outcome of the intervening measurements are dj , ...dn, respectively.”
(p. B1412) But those outcomes correspond to actually performed measurements.
10
